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INTRODUCTION
Technological innovation' is both a significant determinant of
economic growth and important for reducing health, safety, and
environmental hazards. It may be major, involving radical shifts
in technology, or incremental, involving adaptation of prior tech-
nologies. Technological innovation is different from diffusion,
which is the wide-spread adoption of technology already
developed.
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1. Technological innovation is the first commercially successful application of a new
technical idea. By definition, it occurs in those institutions, primarily private profit-seeking
firms, that compete in the marketplace. Innovation should be distinguished from invention,
which is the development of a new technical idea, and from diffusion, which is the subse-
quent widespread adoption of an innovation by those who did not develop it. The distinction
between innovation and diffusion is complicated by the fact that innovations can rarely be
adopted by new users without modification. When modifications are extensive, the result
may be a new innovation. Definitions used in this article draw on a history of several years'
work at the Center for Policy Alternatives at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
beginning with a five-country study: National Support for Science & Technology: An
Explanation of the Foreign Experience (Aug. 18. 1975) (CPA No. 75-12). Some definitions
appear in that study at pages 1-12.
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Several commentators and researchers have investigated the
effects of regulation on technological change.2 Based on this work
and experience gained from the history of industrial responses to
regulation over the past fifteen years, designers may now be able
to fashion regulatory strategies for eliciting the best possible tech-
nological response to achieve specific health, safety, or environ-
mental goals. These technological responses to environmental reg-
ulation include adoption of compliance technology, change in
process technology, and product substitution. In some cases, reg-
ulation need only create a climate in which existing technologies,
known to produce the desired environmental results, will be
adopted or diffused on a large scale. In others, however, the
requisite technology may be lacking altogether, and thus regulation
must stimulate research and development. Underlying a regulatory
strategy based on an assessment of technological options is a
rejection of the premise that regulation must achieve a balance
between environmental integrity and industrial growth, or between
job safety and competition in world markets.3 Rather, such a strat-
egy builds on the thesis that health, safety, and environmental
goals can be co-optimized with economic growth through techno-
logical innovation.
The concept of technological change is the foundation of a
regulatory design strategy based on the promotion of innovation.4
2. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Frane-
work, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1259 (1981): Magat, The kfJects of Environmental Regulation on
Innovation, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter-Spring 1979, at 4. For a review of prior
research at the Center for Policy Alternatives and elsewhere, see Ashford & Heaton.
Regulation and Technological Innovation in the Chemical Industry. 46 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1983, at 109.
3. Environmental, health, and safety regulation, as seen by economists, should cor-
rect market imperfections by internalizing the social costs of industrial production. Regu-
lation results in a redistribution of the costs and benefits of industrial activity among
manufacturers, employers, workers, consumers, and other citizens. Within the traditional
economic paradigm, economically efficient solutions reflecting the proper balance between
costs and benefits of given activities are the major concern.
4. The work of Burton Klein best describes the kind of industry and economic
environment in which innovation flourishes. B. KLEIN, DYNAMIC ECONOMICS (1977).
Klein's work concerns the concept of dynamic efficiency, as opposed to the static economic
efficiency of the traditional economic theorists. In a state of static efficiency, resources are
used most effectively within a fixed set of alternatives. Dynamic efficiency, in contrast,
takes into account a constantly shifting set of alternatives, particularly in the technological
realm. Thus, a dynamic economy, industry, or firm is flexible and can respond effectively
to a constantly changing external environment.
Several conditions are critical to the achievement of dynamic efficiency. A dynami-
cally efficient firm is open to technological development, has a relatively nonhierarchical
structure, possesses a high level of internal and external communication, and shows a
While a new technology may be more costly method of attaining
('relt environmental standards. it may achieve .vsricl'r standards
at less cost than adaptation of existing technology. The following
figure illustrates the difiference.
Suppose it is determined (by either market demand or regu-
latory fiat) that a reduction in health risk from point "A" to the
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FIGURE 1
AN INNOVATIVE RESPONSE TO REGULATION
willingness to redefine organizational priorities as new opportunities emerge. Dynamically
efficient industry groups are open to new entrants with superior technologies and encourage
"rivalrous" behavior among industries already in the sector. In particular, dynamic effi-
ciency flourishes in an environment that is conducive to entrepreneurial risk-taking and
does not reward those who adhere to the technological status quo. Thus, Klein emphasizes
structuring a macroeconomy containing strong incentives for firms to change, adapt, and
redefine the alternatives facing them. Regulation is one of several stimuli which can promote
such a restructuring of a firm's market strategy.
_ .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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dotted line is desirable. Use of existing technological capabilities
would impose a cost represented by point "B." However. if it were
possible to elicit technological innovation, a new "supply curve"
would arise, allowing the same degree of health risk reduction at
a lower cost represented by point "C." Alternatively, a greater
degree of health protection could be afforded if expenditures equal
to costs represented by point "B" were applied instead to new
technological solutions. Note that co-optimization resulting in
"having your cake and eating it too" can occur because a new
dynamic efficiency is achieved.
In creating an atmosphere conducive to innovation, a regula-
tor must assess the innovative capacity of the target industrial
sector. The target sector may be the regulated industry, the pol-
lution control industry, or a related industry capable of producing
substitute technology. The analysis should focus principally on the
process of technological change within the possible responding
sectors. The regulator should analyze a sector's "innovative dy-
namic" rather than its existing, static technological capability. An
assessment of this innovative dynamic requires a historical ex-
amination of the pattern of innovation in the regulated industry,
an evaluation of the technological capabilities of related sectors
having incentives to develop compliance or substitute technology,
and a comparison between the regulated sector and analogous
sectors with documented technological responses to regulation.
The assessment should include an analysis of the industry's exist-
ing technological capabilities as well as a reasoned prediction of
its innovative potential under the challenge of regulation. This kind
of assessment will assist the design of regulations promoting in-
novation beneficial both to public health and the environment, and
to economic growth within the responding industrial sector.
This article will present a model of the effects of regulation
on technological change,' provide a brief history of environmental
regulation affecting innovation, 6 and review innovation waivers
under the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA").7 Finally, it will discuss
5. See infra text accompanying notes 9-33.
6. See infira text accompanying notes 34-139.
7. See infira text accompanying notes 140-231.
Regulation & Innovation 423
concerns regarding the design of regulations which do not pit
technological innovation against other social concerns.x
I. A MODEL OF THE EFFECTS OF REGULATION ON
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
Prior work has developed models for explaining the effects of
regulation on technological change in the chemical, pharmaceuti-
cal, and automobile industries. 9 The schematic below presents a
modified model, structured to assist in designing regulations, rather
than simply to trace the effects of regulation on innovation.
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FIGURE 2
A MODEL FOR REGULATION-INDUCED
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
8. See infra text accompanying notes 232-246.
9. See Asford & Heaton, supra note 2. See also Ashford, Heaton & Priest, Envliron-
mental. Health, and Safety Regulation and Technological Innovation, in TECHNOLOGICAL
INNOVATION FOR A DYNAMIC ECONOMY 161 (1979); Ashford & Heaton, The Effects of
Health and Environmental Regulation on Technological Change in the Chemical Industry:
Theory and Evidence, in FEDERAL REGULATION AND CHEMICAL INNOVATION 45 (C. Hill
ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL REGULATION AND CHEMICAL INNOVATION].
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A. The RegulatorY' Stitnlitl s
Environmental, health, and safety regulations affecting the
chemical industry include controls on air quality, water quality,
solid and hazardous waste, pesticides, food additives, pharmaceu-
ticals, toxic substances, workplace health and safety, and con-
sumer product safety."' These regulations control different aspects
of development or production, change over time, and are "tech-
nology-forcing" to different degrees." Thus, designers of regula-
tions should consider that the effects on technological innovation
will differ among regulations which:
a) require demonstration of product safety prior to marketing
(pesticides, food additives, pharmaceuticals, and new chemicals'2);
b) require demonstration of the efficacy of products prior to
marketing (pharmaceuticals' 3 );
c) require proof of safety or the control of product use after
marketing (existing chemicals under the Toxic Substances Control
Act, worker protection, and consumer products'4 );
10. The statutes from which these regulatory systems derive their authority are as
follows (listed as ordered in the text): Clean Air Act (CAA). 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982);
Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982): Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982): Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1982);: Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)..15
U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982); Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S:C.
§ 651-678 (1982); and Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2083
(1982).
11. Technology-forcing refers to the tendency of a regulation to force industry to
develop new technology. Regulations may force development of new technology by differ-
ent types of restrictions. For example, air and water pollution regulation focuses on "end-
of-pipe" effluents. See, e.g.. CAA, § I I I, 112, 202, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411, 7412, 7521; CWA,
§ 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311. OSHA. in contrast, regulates chemical exposures incident to the
production process. See OSHA, § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 655. The FDCA, FIFRA. and TSCA
impose a pre-market approval process on new chemicals. See FDCA, §§ 409. 505. 21
U.S.C. §§ 348, 355; FIFRA, § 3. 7 U.S.C. § 136a; TSCA, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 2604. The degree
of technology-forcing ranges from pure "health-based" mandates, such as those in the
ambient air quality standards of the Clean Air Act, to a technology diffusion standard, such
as "best available technology" under the Clean Water Act. CAA, § 109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7409(b)(1); CWA, § 301(b). 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b). For a discussion of this issue and a
comparison of statutes, see LaPierre, Tech llology-forcing and Federal Env'ironmental Pro-
tection Statutes, 62 IOWA L. REV. 771 (1977).
12. See FIFRA, § 3, 7 U.S.C. § 136a; FDCA, §§ 409, 505, 21 U.S.C. §§ 348, 355;
TSCA, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 2604.
13. See FDCA. § 505, 21 U.S.C. § 355.
14. See TSCA, § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 2605: OSHA, § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 655; CPSA, § 7, 15
U.S.C. § 2056.
d) control production technology to reduce risks to workplace
health and safety;' 5 and
e) control emissions, effluents, or wastes (air. water. and haz-
ardous waste regulationS6).
Furthermore, the internal structure of regulations may alter
the general climate for innovation. Elements of that structure
include:
a) the form of the regulation (product versus process
regulation);
b) the mode (performance versus specification standards);
c) the time for compliance;
d) the uncertainty; ,
e) the stringency of the requirements; and
f) the existence of other economic incentives which comple-
ment the regulatory signal.
The distinction between regulation of products and regulation
of processes suggests yet a further division.'7 New products differ
from existing products, and production process components differ
from unwanted by-products or pollutants.' 8 Regulations relying on
detailed specification standards may discourage innovation while
prompting rapid diffusion of state-of-the-art technology. Similarly,
though a phased-in compliance schedule may prompt only incre-
mental improvements in technology, it allows a timely industry
response.
An industry's perception of the need to alter its technological
course often precedes promulgation of a regulation. Most environ-
mental regulations arise only after extended scrutiny of a potential
problem by government, citizens, workers, and industry. Prior
scrutiny, according to a study done by the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology,' 9 often has greater effects on industry than formal
15. See OSHA, §§ 3(8), 6, 29 U.S.C. §§ 652(8), 655.
16. See generally CAA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642; CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376;
RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987.
17. In practice, product and process regulations may be difficult to distinguish. If a
process regulation is stringent enough, it effectively becomes a product ban. Product
regulation generally gives rise to product substitution and process regulation generally gives
rise to process change. See FEDERAL REGULATION AND CHEMICAL INNOVATION, supra
note 9, at 58. See also generally Ashford & Heaton, supra note 2.
18. Note, however, that component regulations normally specify elements of the
production process designed to prevent undesirable by-products. See infra note 35.
19. N. Ashford, D. Hattis, G. Heaton, A. Jaffe, S. Owen & W. Priest, Environmental/
Safety Regulation and Technological Change in the U.S. Chemical Industry (Mar. 1979)
(report to the National Science Foundation) (CPA No. 79-6) [hereinafter cited as CPA
1985]
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1985]
rulemaking, because anticipation of regulation stimulates innova-
tion. For example, formal regulation of polychlorinated biphenyls
("PCBs") followed years after the government expressed initial
concern.2 0 Aware of this concern, the original manufacturer and
other chemical companies began to search for substitutes prior to
regulation.' Similarly, most firms in the asbestos products industry
substantially complied with the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration ("OSHA") asbestos regulation years before it was
promulgated.2 2 This preregulation period allows industry time to
develop compliance technologies, process changes, or product
substitutes, while allowing leeway for it to adjust to ensure con-
tinued production or future commercial innovation.
The government's initial show of concern is often, however,
an unreliable stimulus to technological change. Both technical un-
certainties and application of political pressures may cause uncer-
tainty regarding future regulatory requirements. Nevertheless, reg-
ulatory uncertainty is frequently beneficial. Although excessive
regulatory uncertainty may cause industry inaction, .too much cer-
tainty will stimulate only minimum compliance technology. Simi-
larly, too frequent change of regulatory requirements may frustrate
technological development.
Regulatory stringency is the most important factor influencing
technological innovation. A regulation is stringent either
(1) because it requires a significant reduction in exposure to toxic
substances, (2) because compliance using existing technology is
costly, or (3) because compliance requires a significant technolog-
ical change. Policy considerations dictate different degrees of strin-
gency as well, since some statutes require that standards be based
predominantly on environmental, health, and safety concernsi,
some on existing technological capability, and others on the tech-
nology within reach of a vigorous research and development effort.
In the early 1970's, most environmental, health, and safety regu-
lations set standards at a level attainable by existing technology.23
Chemical Industry Study]. Results of this study were published in FEDERAL REGULATION
AND CHEMICAL INNOVATION, spra note 9.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 44-58.
21. Id.
22. W. Priest & S. Bengali, A Microeconomic Study on Productivity: Impact of
OSHA Regulation of the Asbestos Industry, A Collection of Case Studies (Nov. 1981)
(CPA No. 81-26) [hereinafter cited as CPA Asbestos Study].
23. LaPierre, supra note 1, at 837.
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The regulations reflected both a perceived limit to legislative au-
thority and substantial industry influence over the drafting of stan-
dards. More recent regulations have tended toward greater
stringency.24
The effect of the agency's strategy on innovation is not con-
fined to standard-setting. Innovation waivers,2- which stimulate
innovation by allowing noncompliance with existing regulation
while encouraging the development of a new technology, are af-
fected by enforcement strategies as well.26 The degree to which
the requirements of a regulation are strictly enforced may influence
the willingness of an industrial sector to attempt to innovate. The
implementing agency ultimately may strictly enforce environmen-
tal regulations against those firms receiving waivers or, alterna-
tively, it may adopt a "fail-soft" strategy where a firm has made
an imperfect effort, but good faith attempt to comply.27 The latter
strategy is an important element of the regulatory stimulus to
innovation as it decreases an innovator's risk of severe agency
action in the event of failure.28
B. Characteristics of the Responding Industrial Sector
The industry responding to regulation may be the regulated
industry, the pollution control industry, or a related industry. 29
Regulation of existing chemical products or processes might elicit
(1) a pollution control device, (2) a manufacturing process change,
or (3) a product substitution. The regulated industry will likely
supply new processes; the pollution control industry, new devices;
and either the regulated industry or new entrants, product substi-
tutions. Regulation of new chemicals, however, will simply affect
the development of new products.
Recent research on the innovation process has focused on the
innovation "dynamic" in diverse industrial segments throughout
24. This article will concentrate on regulations under the CAA, CWA, OSHA, CPSA,
RCRA, and TSCA.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 140-231.
26. See infia text accompanying notes 210-214.
27. Id.
28. The authors are indebted to David Foster, Director of the Outreach and Economic
Incentives Staff, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, for this insight. See infra text accom-
panying notes 210-214.
29. See supra Figure 2.
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the economy. 3" The model refers to a "productive segment" in
industry,3' defined by the nature of its technology. Over time. the
nature and rate of innovation in the segment will change. Initiallv.
the segment creates a market niche by selling a new product.
superior in performance to the old technology it replaces. The new
technology is typically unrefined, and product change occurs rap-
idly as technology improves.3 2 Because of the rapid product
change, the segment neglects process improvements in the early
period. Later, however, as the product becomes better defined,
more rapid process change occurs. In this middle period, the high
rate of process change reflects the segment's need to compete on
the basis of price rather than product performance. In the latter
stages, both product and process change decline, and the segment
becomes static or rigid. At this point in its cycle, the segment may
be vulnerable to invasion by new ideas or disruption by external
forces that could cause a reversion to an earlier stage.
C. The Design of Regulaltory Strategies
The implications of this model of innovation relate directly to
the design of regulation to promote innovation in three ways. First,
the model suggests that innovation is predictable in a given indus-
trial context. Second, it asserts that the characteristics of a partic-
ular technology determine the probable nature of future innovation
within an industrial segment. Third, it describes a general process
of industrial maturation which appears relatively uniform across
different productive segments. The model does not, however, de-
scribe sources of innovation, nor does it elucidate the forces that
may transform a mature segment into a more innovative one.
The value of this theory of innovation is that of providing a
rationale upon which the designer may fashion a regulation aimed
at the industry most likely to achieve his regulatory goal. Consis-
30. In particular, the work of Abernathy and Utterback offers an important model
of the differences in the nature of innovation across industries and over time. See Abernathy
& Utterback, Patterns o. /lndustrial Innovation, TECH. REV., June-July 1978, at 41. For a
fuller discussion of the model in the context of regulation. see generally Ashford & Heaton,
supra note 2.
31. Automobile engine manufacture would be a productive segment as would vinyl
chloride monomer production, but neither the automobile industry nor the vinyl choloride
industry would be a productive segment since they both encompass too many diverse
technologies.
32. It is typical for the old technology to improve as well, although incrementally,
when a new approach challenges its dominance.
tently, the theory relies on the assumption that the designer may
determine the extent of an industry's innovative rigidity (or flexi-
bility) and its likely response to regulatory stimuli with reference
to objective determinable criteria.
Thus the regulatory designer must make the following three
determinations:
a) what technological response is desirable (for example,
should a regulation force a product or a process change and,
further, should it promote diffusion of existing technology, simple
adaptation, accelerated development of radical innovation already
in progress, or radical innovation);
b) which- industrial sector will most likely innovate; and
c) what kind of regulation will most likely elicit the desired
response.
The first determination requires a technological assessment,
the second a knowledge of a variety of industrial segments, and
the third an application of the model considered in this article.3 -
II. A HISTORY OF STANDARD-SETTING AND THE EFFECTS ON
INNOVATION
A brief review of recent regulation and its effect on techno-
logical change lends empirical support to the model developed in
Section I.34 The review confirms that product regulations tend to
call forth product innovations, that component or pollutant
regulations" tend to elicit process innovations, and that the strin-
gency of regulation is an important determinant of the degree of
technological innovation.3 6 In addition, the respondent's techno-
33. A recently completed research report by the Center for Policy Alternatives at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology may be useful to provide a further conceptual
basis for designing regulation. See N. Ashford & R. Stone, Evaluating the Economic Impact
of Chemical Regulation: Methodological Issues (Feb. 1985) (CPA No. 85-01) thereinafter
cited as CPA Economic Methodology Report]. This research reviews and develops meth-
odologies for assessing past and future dynamic regulatory impacts involving technological
change.
34. A statistical test of the model using early regulatory history appears in the CPA
Chemical Industry Study, supra note 19. Much has happened since that study, but no
attempt has been made to retest the model statistically.
35. Component regulations specify undesirable elements of the production process
while pollutant regulations specify unwanted by-products of the production process. See
CPA Economic Methodology Report, supra note 33, at 26.
36. More precisely, a relatively high degree of stringency appears to be a necessary
condition for inducing more innovative compliance responses. When stringency arises from
technology-forcing characteristics of the regulation, the response tends to be more
innovative.
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logical rigidity helps explain the particular technological solutions.
adopted.
The following historical review is restricted to regulation after
1970 under the Clean Air and Water Acts?7 the Toxic Substances
Control Act ("TSCA"), 3 the Occupational Safety and Health. Act
("OSHA"),3 9 and the Consumer Product Safety Act ("CPSA"),4 "
Furthermore, it is confined to the thrust of the regulation at issue
and a summary of the predominant technological innovations that
followed. This review, therefore, provides neither a complete doc-
umentation of the chronology of regulatory events4 ' nor a full
itemization of industrial responses.42 Of necessity, the statement
of the facts surrounding the regulation must be somewhat subjec-
tive and impressionistic. There is a substantial body of evidence,
however, both from published studies4 3 and anecdotal information
to support the analysis.
Table I summarizes pertinent characteristics of the ten regu-
latory cases considered in the review.
TABLE 1
A Summary of Recent Regulations and the Industrial
Responses
Substance Application Regulatory Type of
Agency Regulation
PCBs
CFCs
All EPA
Aerosol
Mercury Paint
Lead Paint
EPA
CPSC
EPA
Stringency Industry Response
Degree Type
Product Very Radical
Stringent*
Incremental
Product Very Radical
Stringent*
Incremental
Product Very
Stringent
CPSC Product Very
Stringent
Product
Process
Process
Product
Diffusion Product
Diffusion Product
Lead
Each case contains a description of the regulated substance, the
Fuel
Additive
EPA
regulated technology, the regulating agency or agencies, the fr.-pi
Mercury Chloralkali EPA
37. CAA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982); C'WA. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
38. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982).
39. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982).
40. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2083 (1982).
41. Most of the regulations cited were modified several times, and often challenged
in court, before the final standard was established. In addition. in certain cases other
agencies undertook parallel actions. These details are omitted in order to simplify the
discussion. For example, vinyl chloride regulations imposed by EIPA and OSHA are con-
sidered; however, the bans on the use of vinyl chloride materials imposed by the Consumer
Product Safety Commission, the Food and Drug Administration, and the D)epartment of
the Treasury (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco. and Firearms) are not considered. See CPA
Chemical Industry Study, supra note 19. at app. A-28 to A-29.
42. In no case was the industrial response to regulation uniform. Even when the
predominant response was highly innovative, a few firms selected a noninnovative solution
and, in some cases, chose to exit from the industry rather than comply with the regulation.
Conversely, some regulatory responses characterized as noninnovative included a few
innovative solutions as well, but these were the exception in those industries. For examples
of regulation that elicited particularly diverse responses, see ifi-a text accompanying notes
76-86 (lead as a fuel additive), infra text accompanying notes 87-97 (mercury in the
chloralkali industry), infia text accompanying notes 98-114 (lead fiom occupational expo-
sure), and infra text accompanying notes 127-135 (cotton dust).
43. See CPA Chemical Industry Study, supra note 19; CPA Asbestos Study, supra
note 22; R. Goble, D. Hattis, M. Ballew & D. Thurston, Implementation of the Occupational
Lead Exposure Standard (Oct. 1983) (CPA No. 83-1 1) [hereinafter cited as CPA Occupa-
tional Lead Standard Study]; R. Ruttenberg, Compliance.with the OSHA Cotton Dust Rule:
The Role of Productivity-Improving Technology (Mar. 1983) (submitted under contract'to
the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment).
Lead
Product Very
Stringent
Incremental Product
Incremental
Process Stringent
Diffusion
All OSHA Process Very Radical
Manufacture Stringent*
Diffusion
Vinyl All OSHA
Chloride Manufacture EPA
Cotton
Dust
All
Manufacture
Asbestos All
Manufacture
*Substantial doubt about the
was proposed.
Process Very Incremental
Stringent*
Diffusion
OSHA Process Very
Stringent
OSHA Process Mildly
Stringent
Process
Process
Both
Process
Process
Process
430 431
Diffusion Process
Diffusion Process
: standard's technological feasibility at the time the standard
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of the regulation (product or process). the stringency of the regu-
lation, and the nature of the industrial response, by type and degree
of technological innovation. The review begins with product reg-
ulations, followed by pollutant and component regulations.
A. Polychlorinated Biphenylvs
Under TSCA,4 4 the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") prohibited the commercial distribution of PCBs beginning
July 1, 1979, and prohibited the manufacture of PCBs beginning
January 1, 1980. 4 Regulatory surveillance of PCBs in the United
States, however, began as early as 1968,46 and EPA regulation of
PCB effluent discharges began in 1972 under the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments. 4 7
In 1970, before EPA took formal action, Monsanto, the sole
United States PCB manufacturer, voluntarily restricted PCB sales
to closed electrical system uses, such as insulating fluids in trans-
formers and dielectric fluids in power capacitors.4 8 In 1976, three
years before the EPA manufacturing ban, Monsanto gave one
year's notice that it was shutting down its PCB-manufacturing
plant.49 Monsanto's departure from the industry, rather than sub-
sequent EPA regulation, forced PCB users to develop product
substitutes.- 0
44. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982).
45. TSCA, § 6(e)(2)(A). (e)(3)(A). 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(2)(A). (e)(3)(A). Section
6(e)(3)(A) generally prohibits the manufacture of PCBs beginning January . 1979. and the
processing and commercial distribution of PCBs beginning July 1, 1979. Section 6(e)(2)(A)
prohibits the use of PCBs, other than within totally enclosed areas, beginning January 1,
1978. EPA regulations implementing section 6 appear in 40 C.E.R. § 761 (1984).
46. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration began surveillance of PCBs in human
and animal food in 1968. See Highland, PCBs in Food,l ENVIRONMENT, Mar. 1976, at 12.
47. CWA, § 307(a)(2). 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2) (1982). Section 307(a) of the 1972 Act
required EPA to develop and publish a list of toxic pollutants and promulgate an effluent
standard or ban for any pollutant listed by mid-January 1973. EPA did not publish the first
list of nine toxic pollutants, which included PCBs. until nine months after the deadline.
See 38 Fed. Reg. 18,044 (1973). EPA promulgated standards for four toxic pollutants,
including PCBs. during 1977. See 40 C.F.R. 129.105 (published in 42 Fed. Reg. 6555
(1977)).
48. CPA Chemical Industry Study, spra note 19, at A-14.
49. Id. at A-15. Monsanto's actions prior to formal regulation reveal the fiequently
complex role of public pressure and informal government intervention in stimulating private
action. However, it seems appropriate to attribute to the regulatory process Monsanto's
initial actions and the subsequent industrial reactions to Monsanto's withdrawal. See also
Ashford & Heaton. spra note 2. at 120; supra text accompanying note 19.
50. CPA Chemical Industry Study. supra note 19. at A-15. While PCB capacitor and
transformer manufacturers could have imported PCBs from abroad, almost none chose to
do so.
There were two types of technological responses to PCB reg-
ulation: (1) continued use of PCBs with reduction of' associated
hazards and (2) development of substitutes.'' The first response.
ultimately abandoned, included Monsanto's introduction of a new,
more biodegradeable PCB mixture for use in capacitors and a new
Westinghouse 52 capacitor design, reducing PCB use by sixty-six
percent.5 3 The second response was the development of five PCB
substitutes. Dow Corning 54 and General Electric 55 independently
developed the transformer substitute, a type of silicone (polydi-
methylsiloxane). 5 6 The four PCB substitutes for use in capacitors
were isopropyl naphthalene, butylated monochlorodiphenyl oxide,
di-isononyl phthalate ester, and a mixture of di-octyl phthalate
ester with trichlorobenzene.5 7 Because these capacitor compounds
are more flammable than PCBs, the capacitor manufacturers had
to modify the capacitor design slightly, introducing a pressure
switch to prevent explosion.5 8 Overall, PCB regulation caused
modest process innovation and radical and comprehensive product
innovation.
The stringency of the regulation derived from its technology-
forcing aspects. Consistent with the model, product regulation-
in this case, a ban-caused significant product innovation. Tech-
nology-flexible (fluid) firms, the new entrants, pioneered the in-
novation, whereas the rigid Monsanto withdrew.
B. Chlorofluorocarbons in Aerosol Applications
In 1978, the Consumer Product Safety Commission ("CPSC")
and EPA, under TSCA,5 9 established rules banning the use of fully
halogenated chlorofluorocarbons ("CFCs") from aerosol applica-
51. Id. at C-18.
52. Westinghouse is a capacitor firm.
53. CPA Chemical Industry Study, supra note 19, at C-18 (citing B. Kerns, Statement
Representing Westinghouse Corp., in National Conference on PCBs (Nov. 19-21, 1975)
(EPA-560/6-75-004); Telephone interview with Robert Sawyer, Manager of Manufacturing
Support, Westinghouse Distribution Apparatus Division (Apr. 26, 1985).
54. Dow Corning is a silicon producer.
55. General Electric is a silicon producer and a transformer manufacturer.
56. CPA Chemical Industry Study, supra note 19, at C-19.
57. Telephone interview with Robert Sawyer, supra note 53. The first and last were
developed by capacitor firms: the second and third were developed by chemical firms in
conjunction with capacitor firms.
58. CPA Chemical Industry Study, supra note 19, at C-20.
59. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982).
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tions.60 These regulations were a direct response to the potential
threat CFCs posed to stratospheric ozone."
Two innovative responses resulted firom the CFC aecrosol ban.
First, American Cyanamid 62 developed a non-fluorocarbon po-
pellent, using CO2.63 Second, firms outside the chemical industry
developed a new pumping system (called "the pump") not depen-
dent on propellents and cheaper than CFC propellents. 64 The for-
mer represented an incremental product innovation, the latter a
radical process innovation in can delivery systems.
The stringency of the regulation derived from its technology-
forcing aspects. Again, a product regulation stimulated innovation
outside the rigid regulated industrial segment.
C. Mercury in Paint Applications
In 1976, after four years of regulatory proceedings, EPA
banned the use of phenyl mercurials in oil-based paint.6 In oil-
based paints, phenyl mercury compounds served both as in-can
preservatives and as film preservatives."'
The principal industry response to the mercury paint regula-
tion was substitution of existing organic compounds for the mer-
curials.67 Although achievement of the desired properties required
some paint formulation research,68 the response was primar-
ily adoption of existing technology rather than incremental
innovation.
The stringency of the regulation derived from its demalnd for
risk reduction. The immediate availability of suitlable sstitutes
caused diffusion from within the regulated industry rather than
innovation.
D. Lead in Paint Applications
Standards under the Consumer Product Safety Act,6 9 the
Lead-Based Paint Poison Prevention Act,7 0 and the Federal Haz-
ardous Substances Act7' limited the lead content of household
paint to .5% by weight in 1973 and to .06% in 1977.72 The .5%
level effectively prohibited the use of lead pigments, while the
.06% level effectively eliminated the use of lead driers.7
Industry responded to both effective bans with noninnovative
substitution of existing substances. Various organics were already
in use as pigments in some paints, and industry expanded their
use to replace the lead chromates.7 4 For driers, industry had em-
ployed combinations of calcium, zinc, zirconium, and lead. Indus-
try simply removed the lead and replaced it with additional quan-
tities of the other chemicals.75 As with mercury-based paints,
diffusion of suitable substitutes from within the regulated industry
was the result of the demand for lead reduction.
60. See CPSC Regulations for Self-Pressurized Consumer Products Containing Chlo-
rofluorocarbons, 16 C.F.R. § 1401 (1984): EPA Regulations for Fully Halogenated Chlo-
rofluoroalkanes, 40 C.F.R. § 762 (1984). The Food and l)rug Administration also developed
regulations banning the use of CFCs in aerosol applications at this time. See FDA Regu-
lations for Use of Chlorofluorocarbon Propellants in Self-Pressurized Containers. 21 C.F.R.
§ 2.125 (1984).
61. D. Summa, The Case of Regulating Chlorofluorocarbon Emissions fiom Non-
aerosol Applications I I (May 8, 1981) (unpublished thesis submitted to the Dep't of Chem.
Engineering, Massachusetts Inst. of Technology) (available at the CPA. Massachusetts
Inst. of Technology).
62. American Cyanamid is a chemical manufacturer but not a CFC manufacturer.
63. R. Ruttenberg, Regulation Is the Mother of Invention, WORKING PAPERS, May-
June 1981, at 46.
64. Id.
65. See EPA Effluent Guidelines and Standards, 40 C.F.R. § 401.15 (1984): EPA
Regulations for Paint Formulating Point Source Category, 40 C.F.R. § 446.
66. CPA Chemical Industry Study. supra note 19, at C-24.
67. Id. at C-23 (citing 209 CHEM. MARKETING REP. No. 13, at 14 (Mar. 29. 1976)).
These organic compounds appear to satisfy mildewicide and fungicide requirements. but
the durability of the paint has been somewhat impaired.
68. Id.
E. Lead as a Fuel Additive
Under section 211 of the Clean Air Act,76 EPA required oil
producers and large retailers of gasoline to market at least one
69. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2083 (1982).
70. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4821-4846 (1982).
71. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1276 (1982).
72. See HUD Regulations for Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention in Certain
Residential Structures, 24 C.F.R. § 35.12 (1984); CPSC Regulation of Products Subject to
Other Acts Under the Consumer Product Safety Act, 16 C.F.R. § 1145.2 (1984); CPSC Ban
of Lead-Containing Paint and Certain Consumer Products Bearing Lead-Containing Paint,
16 C.F.R. § 1303.
73. CPA Chemical Industry Study, supra note 19, at C-24.
74. Id.
75. Id. However, the organic pigments are more expensive than the lead chromates,
and the non-lead driers do not work as well, particularly under conditions of low temper-
ature and high humidity.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (1982).
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grade of "lead-free" gasoline after July 1, 1974.77 This regulation
was designed to protect catalytic converter emission control sys-
tems.78 Further, after October 1, 1979, EPA required a reduction
in the lead content of regular gasoline.79
The oil companies and the chemical industry responded in
several ways. First, they substituted the existing manganese-based
additive MMT for lead. 8" MMT, however, was found to plug the
catalytic converter and was subsequently prohibited by EPA. 8'
Second, a "lead trap" was developed which captured the lead in
the exhaust and prevented its release to the environment.8 2 Al-
though the innovation was a technical success, the adoption of the
catalytic converter made it unusable, since the lead trap was not
efficient enough to prevent poisoning of the catalyst.8 3 Third, the
removal of lead, an anti-knock compound, prompted increased
catalytic cracking and reforming, at considerable expense. 84 In
response, the petroleum refinery industry developed new catalysts,
making the cracking process more efficient and less costly.85 The
first response was noninnovative and unsuccessful, the second was
quite novel, but commercially unsuccessful, and the third was a
successful incremental innovation. Overall, the industry response
was a partially successful incremental product innovation.8 6
The stringency of the regulation derived from its technology-
forcing aspect. The variety of innovative responses illustrates the
technological flexibility of the industry.
77. "Lead free" gasoline may not contain more than 0.05 grams of lead per gallon.
See generally CAA, § 21 I, 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (1982) (implemented by EPA Regulations on
Fuels and Fuel Additives, 40 C.F.R. § 80.22(b) (1984)).
78. 40 C.F.R. § 80.1. See also CPA Chemical Industry Study, spra note 19, at
A-8.
79. Regulations required a reduction in lead content at large refineries to 1.1 grams
per gallon. See 40 C.F.R. § 80.20.
80. CPA Chemical Industry Study, spra note 19, at A-10.
81. Id. (citing Concern over E.f'fects on Atutomobile Catalytic Converters Prompting
Governmentllndustry Striuggle on Fuel Additive MMT, 18 Current Developments] ENV'T
REP. (BNA) 464 (July 22, 1977): EPA Bans Octane Booster MMT, Cites Damnlage to
Catalytic Converteters. 9 Current Developmentsl ENV'T REP. (BNA) 913 (Sept. 15. 1978)).
82. CPA Chemical Industry Study, supra note 19, at C-16.
83. Id.
84. Ashford & Heaton. supra note 2. at 132 n.57.
85. Id.
86. The new product, unleaded gasoline, necessitated process innovation. The inter-
relation of process and product innovation is sometimes very important in the development
of new chemicals.
F. Mercury in the Chloralkali Indlistrv
Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972,87 EPA established effluent standards for existing mercury
chloralkali plants limiting mercury discharges to a maximum of
0.28 grams per 1000 kg. of product for any one day by July 1977.88
In addition, under the Clean Air Act, EPA promulgated an emis-
sion standard applicable to mercury chloralkali plants limiting mer-
cury discharges to 2300 grams over a 24-hour period.89
Industry responded in three major ways to the mercury ef-
fluent standards.90 First, it separated the process water and cooling
water streams so that the cooling water no longer could come in
contact with mercury.9' Second,, it treated the process water
stream by a variation of a sulfide precipitation process to remove
almost all the mercury.92 Third, in some cases, it dug up all of the
sewer pipes, inspected them for trapped mercury, and cleaned or
replaced them. 93 The first response was a significant process in-
novation by the regulated industry. Although the idea of sulfide
precipitation was not new, 94 its application in the second response
was an incremental innovation. The third response, of course, was
not innovative.
Industry responded to the Clean Air Act requirements by
diffusion of existing pollution control devices.9 5 Primarily, combi-
nations of mist eliminators, refrigeration, chemical scrubbing,
"molecular sieves," and carbon adsorption removed the mercury
mist and vapor in the gas stream.96 In addition, industry introduced
87. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-5(),
86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982)).
88. EPA Effluent Guidelines and Standards for Inorganic Chemicals, 40 C.F.R.
§ 415.62(a) (1984). In addition, the average of daily values for 30 days is limited to 0.14
grams per 1000 kg. of product. Id. Furthermore, for new plants, mercury discharges must
not exceed 0.23 grams per 1000 kg. of product for any day, and the 30-day average must
not exceed 0.10 grams per 1000 kg. of product. 40 C.F.R. § 415.65(a).
89. EPA Regulations on National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants,
40 C.F.R. § 61.52.
90. CPA Chemical Industry Study, supra note 19, at C-I I (citing CHEM. ENG'G, Feb.
3, 1975, at 36).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at C-ll to C-13.
96. Idt. at C-12 (citing CHEM. & ENG'G NEWS, Feb. 14, 1972, at 15).
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several housekeeping improvements, including epoxy floors (to
prevent mercury buildup in cracks) and tight covers for mercury
containers.9 7
G. Lead fiom Occupational Exposure
OSHA promulgated the current occupational lead standard in
1978, setting the permissible exposure limit (PEL) at 50 [Lg/m 3
averaged over eight hours, to be satisfied through a combination
of engineering controls, work practices, and administrative con-
trols.98 Since the standard was explicitly technology-forcing, how-
ever, OSHA granted the major affected industries long lead times
before it required engineering compliance. The standard granted
primary smelting a ten-year exemption, and secondary smelting
and battery manufacture five-year exemptions.99 The OSHA lead
standard also required biological monitoring.""'
The primary smelting, secondary smelting, and battery man-
ufacture industries responded, in part, by a combination of source-
reducing controls, worker isolation, and improved work prac-
tices.'0 ' Source-reducing engineering and ventilation control in-
cluded enclosing and ventilating dust-emitting processes and au-
tomating certain processes.""2 Isolation techniques involved
surrounding the worker with control booths or cabs with filtered
air. 103 Work practices included improved worker training and better
97. Id. at C-12. An additional effect of the combined mercury regulations was closure
of a few plants and a halt of the construction of new mercury cell plants. Conversely. the
regulations have accelerated the development of a membrane cell which allows production
of mercury cell-quality caustic without the use of mercury. Unfortunately. the membrane
technology suffers from poor durability of the membrane itself, which leads to poor elec-
trical efficiency as the membrane ages. Id. at C-12 to C-13.
98. Occupational Safety and Health Standards Subpart Z-Toxic and Hazardous Sub-
stances, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025(c) (1984). Actually, the OSHA standard does not require
the 50 ixg/m 3 standard to be met under all conditions. Rather it requires that, when air
values are above this value, all "feasible" engineering control measures be taken to reduce
them. CPA Occupational Lead Standard Study, supra note 43, at 3-55 (citing 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.1025(e)).
99. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025(e). In the interim, compliance with the standard could be
achieved through employee use of respirators. Id.
100. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025(d). See lso CPA Occupational Lead Standard Study,
supra note 43, at 2-27; Ashford, Spadafor & Caldart; Human Monitoring: Scientific. Legal
and Ethical Concerns, 8 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 263, 270 (1984).
101. CPA Occupational Lead Standard Study, spra note 43, at 3-58.
102. Id.
103. Id.
housekeeping practices such as frequent cleaning to lessen dust
accumulation on floors."' 4 Most of these process changes involved
the diffusion of existing technology.
Industry produced some innovative responses as well. The
primary smelting industry developed a new "direct smelting" pro-
cess in place of the traditional sinter machine and blast furnace."' -5
The direct smelting process converts lead sulfide to lead metal in
one step, substantially reducing lead exposure." The secondary
smelting industry developed two process innovations. One in-
volved the use of a shaft furnace,'07 improvements in the battery
breaking process, and revised dust-handling in the exhaust
gases." 8 The other used an improved covered system for convey-
ing molten lead from the smelting furnace and improved ventilating
systems for conveying dust from the workplace"s In addition, a
third secondary smelting process innovation is on the drawing
board. Oxygen enrichment will be used in the blast furnaces to
reduce lead fumes."" Here, technology-forcing regulation dramat-
ically revitalized the innovative potential of a rigid, mature indus-
try. This response is the kind of change Klein's concept of restruc-
turing would predict."'
Finally, the battery industry accelerated its development of a
product innovation and introduced a new process technology. The
accelerated product innovation was a shift to smaller batteries,
containing less lead and relying on lead-calcium rather than lead-
antimony alloys. " 2 The new process technology, adapted primarily
for use with the new lead-calcium alloy batteries, was the "ex-
panded metal" process for forming battery grids.". ' Instead of
casting the grids from molten lead in the conventional process, a
coil of metallic lead sheet is cut at intervals, expanded, pressed,
and pasted. This process minimizes dust after the paste has
104. Id.
105. Id. at 3-62.
106. Id.
107. Previously, industry had used a traditional two-stage reverberatory/blast furnace
system. Id. at 3-63.
108. Id. However, this secondary smelting technology does not fully meet the
50 i.g/m' standard by engineering controls alone. Id. at 3-64.
109. Id.
110. Id.
ll1. See supra note 4.
112. CPA Occupational Lead Standard Study, supra note 43, at 3-65.
113. Id.
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dried."14 In sum, the dominant industry response was the intro-
duction of radical product and process innovations. This was the
response of a technology-flexible (fluid) battery industry.
H. Vinyl Chloride
The regulation of vinyl chloride occurred within a short time
amid a crisis atmosphere following its identification as a human
carcinogen. The 1974 OSHA final standard limited vinyl chloride
exposure to I ppm averaged over an eight-hour period with a 5
ppm ceiling averaged over a fifteen minute period."1 5 In 1976, EPA,
under the Clean Air Act," 6 developed emissions standards for
vinyl chloride monomer ("VCM") and polyvinyl chloride ("PVC")
plants."7 The EPA standards limited stack emissions, required
control of fugitive emissions, and forced stripping of PVC resins
in order to remove residual vinyl chloride monomer ("RVCM").""
The technological feasibility of both the OSHA and the EPA vinyl
chloride standards was questioned at the time the regulations were
proposed. "9
The PVC polymerization industry was most affected by the
OSHA and EPA vinyl chloride standards. 2'" In response, the in-
dustry: (1) installed continuous monitoring devices to identify a
vinyl chloride leak; (2) installed dual seal pumps and dual rupture
disks on the reactors to reduce leaks; (3) combined condensation,
adsorption, and incineration to reduce the VCM concentration in
the process vent-gas stream; (4) modified the reactant recipe to
reduce' resin buildup inside the reactor; (5) automated reactor
cleaning systems, obviating the need to open the reactor; and
(6) developed improved stripping technology to reduce resin han-
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dling.' 2' The last three responses were all acceler(lted incremental
process innovations, and were to be expected from a technology-
flexible (fluid) industrial segment. The first three were merely dif-
fusion of existing technology.
The OSHA regulation did not severely affect the VCM man-
ufacturers. They were able to achieve compliance by tightening
valves and fixing leaks.' 22 The EPA regulation did require, how-
ever, the introduction of incineration to reduce the vent-gas
streams to the required VCM concentration.'23
Finally, the PVC plastics fabricators were covered only by
the OSHA regulation. The fabricators' problem resulted from
RVCM which remained in the resins as they came from the poly-
merizers.' 2 4 The fabricators reduced VCM concentrations using
three approaches: (I) extra ventilation, (2) minimizing worker ex-
posure by automating materials handling tasks, and (3) driving off
the RVCM in a controlled way during the first processing step.125
The last two approaches were incremental process innovations.
The PVC polymerizers, however, provided the primary solution
to the fabricators' problem. As suppliers responding to the OSHA
regulation, they removed most of the RVCM before delivering the
PVC resins to the fabricators.' 26
1. Cotton Dust
The 1984 final OSHA cotton dust standard established per-
missible exposure limits of 200 [tg/m3 for yarn manufacturing, 750
l1g/m3 for slashing and weaving operation, and 500 ixg/m 3 for all
other processes in the cotton industry and for other non-textile
114. Id.
115. Occupational Safety and Health Standards Subpart Z-Toxic and Hazardous
Substances, 29 C.F.R. § 1910. 1017(c) (1984).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1982).
117. EPA Regulations on National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollu-
tants, 40 C.F.R. § 61.65 (1984) (pursuant to CAA, § 112. 42 U.S.C. § 7412).
118. Both the OSHA and EPA standards are essentially pollutant regulations: how-
ever, each contains elements of a component regulation as well. For example, the OSHA
regulation specified protective equipment and the EPA regulation specified stripping pro-
cedure in order to eliminate RVCM. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1017(f). (g). (h); 40 C.F.R.
§ 61.64.
119. See CPA Chemical Industry Study, supra note 19, at app. A-26 to A-28.
120. Id. at C-2.
121. Id. at C-2 to C-9. By sealing the reactor to reduce leakage (in the second and
fifth responses). the PVC polymerizaton firms also improved their production yield since
less material was lost during processing. This phenomenon, of unintended benefits related
to compliance with a regulation (usually caused by indivisible results of investment deci-
sions or by, as here, conjoint characteristics of the compliance technology) is too pervasive
to be considered a curiosity. See CPA Economic Methodology Report, supra note 33, at
15.
122. CPA Chemical Industry Study, supra note 19, at C-9.
123. 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.62-61.66. See also CPA Chemical Industry'Study, supra note
19, at C-9.
124. CPA Chemical Industry Study, spra note 19, at C-2.
125. Id. at C-3.
126. Id.
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industries where there is exposure to cotton dust.' 7 The standard
was intended to take effect in September 1978, but court
challenges 28 shifted the compliance date until March 1984.'"
The OSHA cotton dust standard probably prompted, and cer-
tainly accelerated, the full-scale modernization of the United
States textile industry.'" That modernization and the associated
compliance with the OSHA standard were accomplished not by
radical or even incremental innovation, but by the broad diffusion
of existing textile technology,"' most of which was developed in
the 1960's. 132 Examples of major process substitution included
replacing manual feeding in cotton opening rooms with automatic
equipment, using chute-fed cards to eliminate manual carding and
manual cleaning, shifting from conventional ring spinning to open-
end spinning, and replacing shuttles with shuttleless looms.' 3 The
relationship between the new technology and the cotton dust emis-
sions was crucially interactive. On the one hand, the new equip-
ment produced much less cotton dust: on the other, the new equip-
ment was more sophisticated and highly sensitive to dust. 3 4
Modernization in textile technology both required and caused re-
duced cotton dust emissions. In short, improved productivity and
compliance with cotton dust standards were synergistic efforts.
Commentators have convincingly argued that the U.S. textile in-
dustry has derived a net benefit from the OSHA cotton dust
regulation. 13 s
J. Asbestos
The 1972 OSHA asbestos standards limited airborne asbestos
particles in the workplace to five fibers per cubic centimeter. '6
127. Occupational Safety and Health Standards Subpart Z-Toxic and Hazardous
Substances, 29 C.F.R. 1910. 1043(c) (1984).
128. See, e.g., American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 402 U.S. 490 (1981): AFL-
CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. '1979).
129. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1043(e)(3)(iii).
130. R. Ruttenberg, spra note 43. at 61.
131. Ruttenberg calls this adoption "technology-forcing.' Id. at 43-45. However, in
this article the term is used in a narrower sense, reserving it for innovation, and not
diffusion, of technology.
132. Id. at 62.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 73.
135. Id. at ii.
136. Occupational Safety and Health Standards Subpart Z-Toxic and Hazardous
Substances, 29 C.F.R. § 1910. 1)00(b)t I) ( 1984).
The asbestos industry, most plants of which were at least
thirty years old at the time of the OSHA regulation, responded
primarily by adopting pollution control technology.' 7 It enclosed
manufacturing operations under hoods and covers and introduced
vacuum systems to remove fly asbestos fibers.'38 By failing to
impose a more stringent standard, arguably necessary to protect
workers' health, OSHA lost the opportunity to accelerate new
product development and encourage product substitution.' 39
III. INNOVATION WAIVERS
Some commentators have argued that traditional modes of
regulation are a limited approach to reducing environmental pol-
lution and that new incentive approaches will more effectively
stimulate the technological innovation necessary to achieve de-
sired levels of air and water quality.' 4" A few have contended that
market forces such as entrepreneurial risk taking, cost reduction,
and profit maximization should be used to encourage private firms
to develop innovative technology for pollution control.' 4 '
In the early 1970's, the National Bureau of Standards com-
missioned a series of studies to explore possible modifications in
regulatory policy, practices, and procedures to encourage firms to
innovate. 42 The studies, completed in 1976, examined such mech-
anisms as effluent taxes, tax subsidies, joint research and devel-
opment pooling, and innovation waivers. This section examines
one of those mechanisms, the innovation waiver, now incorporated
137. CPA Asbestos Study, spra note 22, at 19.
138. Id. A few firms, such as those in the asbestos-reinforced plastics sector, devel-
oped asbestos substitutes, but the consensus of the industry was that substitute products
lacked the versatility and performance of asbestos. In addition, some substitutes, such as
fiberglass, had their own associated health risks. Id. at 17.
139. See genterally NIOSH-OSHA ASBESTOS WORK GROUP, WORKPLACE EXPOSURE
TO ASBESTOS: REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS (198()) (DHHS (NIOSH) 81-103); U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL WORKSHOP ON SUBSTI-
TUTES FOR ASBESTOS (1980) (EPA 560/3-80-001).
140. Watson, An Annotated Bibliography f Literature on Market Meclhanisms and
Economic Incentives for Environmental Regulation, in DEP'T OF COMMERCE ETIP POLICY
RESEARCH SERIES, VOL. 5, INCENTIVES FOR TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION IN AIR POL-
LUTION REDUCTION (Oct. 1979) (NBS-GCR-ETIP 80-90).
141. Id.
142. The studies are summarized in J. BOOTH & Z. COOK, AN EXPLORATION OF
REGULATORY INCENTIVES FOR INNOVATION: SIX CASE STUDIES (Aug. 1979) (NBS-GCR-
ETIP 79-66). See also J. BOOTH & Z. COOK, TAXONOMY OF INCENTIVE APPROACHES FOR
STIMULATING INNOVATION (Aug. 1978) (NBS-GCR-ETIP 78-53).
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into several federal pollution control statutes.'4 3 The examination
will evaluate the effectiveness of innovation waivers appearing in
the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and RCRA.
Innovation waivers are incentive devices built into environ-
mental regulations. Generally, the waivers extend deadlines by
which industry must install pollution control equipment to meet
emissions permit limitations. Development of an innovative idea
into an operational reality often requires trial periods and substan-
tial time, during which a firm can incur penalties from violations
of emissions or effluent standards. The innovation waiver exempts
industry from penalties during trial periods and offers it the pros-
pect of cost savings derived from a superior technology.
The waivers provide the opportunity for entrepreneurs, who
propose to employ innovative technologies to meet environmental
standards, to proceed within a relaxed regulatory atmosphere. In
theory, the waivers encourage industry to develop new pollution
control and hazardous waste disposal technologies that are either
more effective than existing technologies, less expensive, or both.
In practice, they have not achieved their intended effect.
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970'44 and the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972'4-1 were ambi-
tious regulatory schemes, technology-forcing in their focus. The
1970 Clean Air Act required EPA to establish uniform national
ambient air quality standards ("NAAQS").' 46 In addition, the Act
required EPA to establish nationally uniform emission limitations
with respect to new stationary sources,' 4 7 hazardous air pollutants
from either new or existing stationary sources,'4 8 and new motor
vehicles.' 49 New source performance standards ("NSPS") for sta-
tionary sources were intended to reflect the best available control
technology, taking into account the cost of compliance. The motor
vehicle standards applied stringent emission limitations to auto-
143. CAA, §§ 11Il(), 113(d)(4), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(j), 7413(d)(4) (1982); CWA,
§ 301(k), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(k) (1982); Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-616, § 214, 98 Stat. 3221, 3243 (1984) (to be codified at RCRA. § 3005(g),
42 U.S.C. § 6925(g)).
144. Pub. L. No. 91-604. 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-
7642).
145. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1376).
146. CAA, § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409.
147. Id. § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411.
148. Id. § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412.
149. Id. § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 7521.
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mobiles, requiring ninety percent reductions over uncontrolled
emission levels by 1975-76, with limited provision for the exten-
sion of deadlines.'1"
The ambitious standards established under the 1970 Act
proved to be difficult to achieve.'' The Act established rigid dead-.
lines for compliance and gave the primary responsibility for at-
taining the NAAQS to the states. By 1976, it was clear that many
air quality areas were not going to meet the deadlines for attaining
the ambient standards. Tension between the statutory require-
ments and the need for continued economic growth led to pressure
for a revised federal policy. 152
*The national experience under the 1972 Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act was similar to that under the 1970 Clean Air Act.
The 1972 Water Act imposed pollution control methods on indus-
trial dischargers in two phases: () industry was required to employ
the "best practicable control technology" ("BPT") by July 1,
1977,'5 3 and (2) industry was required to employ the "best available
technology" ("BAT") by July 1, 1983.'54 Nearly fifteen percent of
the industrial dischargers nationwide failed to meet the 1977 BPT
deadline.' 55 The iron and steel industry had the worst record with
forty-six percent of the nation's iron and steel plants failing to
meet the deadline. 5 6 Industry representatives lobbied for statutory
150. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 202(b)(1)(A). (B),
(b)(5)(A), (B), 84 Stat. 1676, 1690-91 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(1)(A), (B),
(b)(5)(A), (b)(6)(A)).
151. For a comprehensive discussion of the problems of the Clean Air Act of 1970
and the legislative response to those problems embodied in the 1977 amendments, see
Davis, Kurtock, Leape & Magill, The Clean Air Act Amendments (Fo 1977: Away frnom
Technology-Forcing?, 2 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. (1977).
152. Id. at 5-22.
153. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500,
§ 301(b)(1)(A), 86 Stat. 816, 843 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A)).
The complete statutory language is "the best practicable control technology currently
available." Id. The EPA Administrator defines BPT taking into account various factors
including the process employed, the age of the equipment and facilities, the relationship of
the cost of the treatment to the benefits of effluent reduction, the engineering aspects, and
whatever else he deems appropriate. See CWA, § 304(b)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1).
154. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500,
§ 301(b)(2)(A), 86 Stat. 816, 845 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A)).
The complete language is "best available technology economically achievable." Id. The
EPA Administrator defines BAT, considering essentially the same factors as for BPT.
Compare CWA, § 304(b)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(B) with CWA, § 304(b)(1)(B), 33
U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B).
155. See 123 CONG. REC. 26,691 (1977) (testimony of Thomas C. Jorling, EPA
Assistant Adm'r for Water and Hazardous Materials, before the Senate Comm. on Env't
and Pub. Works as reported by Sen. Muskie).
156. Id. at 26,695 (remarks of Sen. Muskie).
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extensions of the 1977 BPT deadline, arguing that EPA's tardiness
in issuing final guidelines on effluent limitations for some industries
did not allow firms sufficient time to comply. In addition. many
industrial groups cited serious financial and technological diffiutl-
ties in developing compliance technology in time to meet the
deadline. 1.7
The 1970 Clean Air Act and the 1972 Water Act were amended
in 1977.158 The amendments to both statutes represented a move
away from the purely regulatory approach of the previous amend-
ments to one manifesting a greater willingness to use market in-
centives to achieve statutory goals. Each of the statutes was
amended to include, among other things, innovation waivers,
which constituted an attempt by Congress to foster economic
growth while ensuring public health and environmental protection.
A. The Clean Air Act
I. The Waiver Provisions
The Clean Air Act contains two innovation waiver provi-
sions.'5 9 One encourages new sources to innovate, the other fo-
cuses on existing sources. The new source innovation waiver ap-
pears in section I I(j) of the Clean Air Act."'" It grants the EPA
Administrator authority to waive NSPS "to encourage the use of
an innovative technological system or systems of continuous emis-
sion reduction."'6 ' Section I 11(j) allows a waiver after notice and
opportunity for public hearing if:
a) the proposed technology has not been "adequately
demonstrated"; 62
157. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments o 1977, Hearings Befire
the Subhcomml. on Envtil. Pollttion of the Senate C(iomin. on E't t itd Pub. Works, Part 8,
95th Cong., Ist Sess. 516-18: id., Part 10, at 551, 755-56 (testimony of industry represen-
tatives). For a comprehensive review of the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments and revisions made by the CWA of 1977, see Voytko. Hunciker & Lazarus.
The Clean Water Act iland Related Developments in the Federal Water Pollution Control
Prograim During 1977, 2 HARV. ENVTt.. . RF.V. 103 (1977).
158. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. Pub. 1.. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982)): Clean Water Act of 1977. Pub. L.. No. 95-
217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982)).
159. CAA, §§ 11 1j), 113(d)(4). 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(j). 7413(d)(4) (1982).
160. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(j).
161. CAA, § II (j)(l)(A). 42 U.S.C. § 7411(j)(1)(A).
162. Id. § I j)(1)(A)(i). 42 U.S.C. § 741 1j)( )(A)(i).
b) the proposed technology "will operate effectively";' 6 3
c) "there is a substantial likelihood" that the proposed tech-
nology will either reduce emissions below that required by NSPS
or achieve a reduction equivalent to NSPS "at lower cost in terms
of energy, economic, or nonair quality environmental impact":'" 4
d) the owner or operator of the proposed technology has
demonstrated that it will not "cause or contribute to an unreason-
able risk to public health, welfare, or safety";' 65 and
e) granting the waiver "will not prevent attainment and main-
tenance of any national ambient air quality standards."' 66
Under section 11 I(j),"the EPA Administrator determines the
duration of the innovation waiver, which may not exceed seven
years after the issue date or four years after the source begins
operation.'67 If the innovative technology fails, the waiver is ter-
minated.' 68 In that case, the statute grants the innovator up to
three penalty-exempt years to comply by means of conventional
technology. 169
The existing source waiver appears in section 13(d)(4) of the
Clean Air Act. It is a delayed compliance order offered as one of
several enforcement options rather than a waiver expressly de-
signed to promote technological innovation. An existing source
violating a standard may apply for a section 113(d)(4) order if:
a) it proposes to use a new means of emission limitation which
is "likely to be adequately demonstrated . . . upon expiration of
the order";' 70
b) it is "not likely" to use the innovative technology unless a
section 113(d)(4) order is granted;' 7'
c) its proposed technology has "a substantial likelihood" of
either reducing emissions below the applicable standard or achiev-
ing an equivalent reduction "at lower cost in terms of energy,
economic, or nonair quality environmental impact";' 72 and
163. Id. §
164. Id.
165. Id. §
166. Il. §
167. Id. §
168. Id. §
169. Id. §
170. Id. §
171. Id. §
172. Id. §
I1 i(j)()(A)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 741(10)(1)(A)(ii).
I l (j )(A)(iii), 42 U.S.C. § 741 I(j)(I)(A)(iii).
I l0)(I)(B)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 741 1j)(I)(B)(i).
II I(j)(I)(E), 42 U.S.C. § 74110(j)(I)(E).
II l(j)(l)(D)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(j)(1)D)(ii).
11 I(j)(2)(A). 42 U.S.C. § 7411(j)(2)(A).
113(d)(4)(A). 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(4)(A).
113(d)(4)(B). 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(4)(B).
I13(d)(4)(C). 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(4)(C).
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d) its compliance with the applicable standard would be "im-
practicable prior to, or during, the installation" of the innovative
technology. '73
The section 113(d)(4) order can extend to five years from "the
date on which the source would otherwise be required to be in full
compliance with the requirement."' 7 4 The wording has sparked
debate over the effective starting date of the order, but EPA rec-
ognizes the required compliance date in the source's State Imple-
mentation Plan ("SIP"). 1'7- Although section 11 I(j) provides a three-
year, penalty-exempt compliance period if the innovation fails,
section 113(d)(4) provides no extensions beyond the five-year
period. 17 6
2. Implementation of the Waivers
Congress intended the innovation waivers incorporated into
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 to encourage industry to
develop innovative pollution control technology. The waivers,
however, generally have failed to elicit that response. A study of
the Clean Air Act waivers conducted in 1980 for the Experimental
Technology Incentives Program ("ETIP") of the Department of
Commerce involved a survey of activity under sections I I (j) and
113(d)(4), interviews of EPA personnel involved with innovation
waivers, and reports on industry's perception of the waiver appli-
cation process.' 7 7 The study revealed that within the first three-
year period, few companies had applied for innovation waivers,
EPA had granted only one application, and companies that had
applied were reluctant to do so again.'7 8
173. Id. § 11 3(d)(4)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(4)(D).
174. Id.
175. Evans, Opporttunities fior Inovation: Adllinistration of Sections Ill(j) and
113(d)(4) of the Clean Air Act and Industrv's Development of Innovative Control 7Technol-
ogy. in DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE ETIP POLICY RESEARCH SERIES, VOL. 3, INCENTIVES
FOR TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION IN AIR POLLUTION REDUC rION 7 (Jan. 1980).
176. CAA, § 113(d)(4)(D). 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(4)(D).
177. Evans. supra note 175, at 10.
178. Id. at 15. 19-31. The study surveyed the EPA Division of Stationary Source
Enforcement (currently known as the Stationary Source Compliance Division) and regional
offices and found that, as of January 1980. five applications for section 11 I(j) waivers had
been received; none had been approved, one was denied. one was abandoned, and three
were pending. Id. at 15. Approximately 18 applications for section I 13(d)(4) compliance
delay orders had been received: one was approved. six were denied, two were abandoned.
six were pending, and the rest were unidentified. I.
The study documented numerous reasons cited by EPA per-
sonnel and industry spokesmen for the modest response to inno-
vation waivers. First, agency and industry personnel alike per-
ceived certain legislative directives as ambiguous. resulting in
confusion regarding the eligibility of technology for an innovation
waiver. 179 Section 11 l(j)(l)(A) refers to "an innovative technolog-
ical system" and section 113(d)(4) refers to "new means." The
statute does not specify with any particularity what constitutes
"new" or "innovative," and thereby grants EPA wide discretion
to determine what technology qualifies for a waiver. "Innovative"
can refer to a range of activity, including the new application or
new combination of existing technologies, the large-scale appli-
cation of technology previously existing only in laboratory models,
or development of a previously unknown, radically different new
technology. The agency has not provided guidelines regarding what
types of activities within that range it would consider for eligibility.
Agency and industry personnel also perceived subsections
11 I(j)(l)(A)(i) and (ii) as ambiguous, increasing the uncertainty of
a technology's eligibility for a waiver. 8' EPA not only must de-
termine that the proposed technology has not been "adequately
demonstrated," but it also must find that it "will operate effec-
tively." Again, the agency has not provided industry with any
guidelines relative to the range in which a technology is unproven
enough to be "new" and "innovative," but at the same time suffi-
ciently proven to demonstrate that it will operate effectively.
A case documented in the ETIP empirical study reports a
prolonged delay in determining whether a proposed technology
was innovative.'"' The Homer City site of the Pennsylvania Elec-
tric Company ("Penelec") applied for an innovation waiver in No-
vember 1977 for a proposed method of reducing its SO2 emissions.
Penelec proposed to meet NSPS and reduce energy, economic,
and nonair quality environmental costs by using a new, sophisti-
cated coal cleaning system, known as the Multi-Stream Coal
Cleaning System ("MCCS"), rather than conventional scrubber
technology. The MCCS is a complex system that physically cleans
raw coal in various stages, removing substantial quantities of pyrit-
ic sulphur and other impurities. Although coal cleaning itself is
not a new technology, the MCCS is unique in the way in which it
179. Id. at 8, 37.
180. Id. at 7.
181. Id. at 23.
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blends and refines known technologies and applies them on a large
commercial scale. EPA took several years to determine whether
the proposed technology was innovative under section l l (j).X' In
this case, both the agency and Penelec would have benefitted 'from
regulatory directives regarding the types of technologies that EPA
would consider for eligibility.
The ETIP study concludes that the perceived ambiguity has
resulted in confusion and has hampered implementation of the
waiver provisions. As noted, EPA possesses considerable discre-
tion to determine what technology is eligible for a waiver. In order
to use that discretion wisely to encourage the development of
innovative technology, the agency should provide industry with
guidelines regarding the parameters of the activity it considers
innovative. Detailed interpretative rules are not desirable because
they would tend to define the technology that Congress intended
industry to invent, and thereby restrict industry's creativity. EPA,
however, should provide industry with a balanced interpretation
of eligibility which will leave industry neither paralyzed by inde-
cision nor hemmed in by a lack of options.
Industry and EPA personnel also point to statutory time lim-
itations on innovation waivers as disincentives.'8 3 Section 111(j)
limits a new source to seven penalty-free years to develop, install,
and refine innovative technology. 8 4 Should the innovation fail, the
statute allows the source up to three years to install conventional
technology.' 5 Section 113(d)(4) limits an existing source to five
years past its SIP compliance date to develop fully and refine its
technology. It allows no grace period should the new technology
fail.'8 6 Given the uncertainty inherent in untested processes, the
statute's inflexible deadlines may deter some of the innovation that
the waivers were designed to promote. Certainly they discourage
radical innovation where compliance deadlines must be highly
flexible. They would deter incremental and accelerated innovation,
however, to a lesser degree.
Constraints in the administration of sections 11l(j) and
113(d)(4) have hampered implementation of innovation waivers
182. See Waiver from NSPS for Homer City Unit No. 3. Steam Electric Generating
Station. Indiana County. Pennsylvania. 40 C.F.R. 60.47 (1984).
183. Evans. supra note 175. at 17-18.
184. CAA. §I ll(j)(l)(E). 42 U.S.C. § 7411(j)(1)(E) (1982).
185. Id. § I )(2)(A). 42 U.S.C. § 741 1(j)(2)(A).
186. Id. § 113(d)(4)(1)). 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(4)(1)).
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under the Clean Air Act as well.'8 7 The EPA Stationary Source
Compliance Division ("SSCD"), 88 the enforcement branch of
EPA, implements innovation waivers. That task is, perhaps. mis-
placed. The SSCD was apparently selected to administer section
113(d)(4) because the section appears in the statute under "Federal
Enforcement."' 8 9 Since-sections 113(d)(4) and 111(j) function sim-
ilarly, EPA decided that SSCD should administer both.'9 0 SSCD's
mission, however, is enforcement, which may render it unsuited
to promote innovation.
The EPA personnel interviewed in the ETIP study claim that
SSCD's proclivity for enforcement has distorted its implementa-
tion of sections 11l(j) and 113(d)(4).' 9' SSCD has narrowly inter-
preted the waiver provisions, fearing a deluge of applications by
firms seeking to buy time and avoid noncompliance penalties.' 92
Although statutory ambiguity may have justified SSCD's original
concern, the flood failed to appear. Nonetheless, the ETIP study
indicates that many of the waiver applicants mistook the waivers
for automatic exemptions from noncompliance penalties.' 193 Firms
also have the option of seeking consent decrees to establish new
compliance schedules, but consent decrees would not exempt them
from noncompliance penalties.' 94
Assigning exclusive authority over the administration of in-
novation waivers to an office in a position to accord higher priority
and greater attention to the program would promote use of the
waivers and prevent misuse. The stindard-setting office of EPA,
or an ombudsman working with the standard-setting office, might
administer the waivers more flexibly to encourage industry partic-
ipation. The standard-setting office possesses the expertise for
evaluating existing and potential technological capabilities, for
187. Evans, supra note 175, at 10.
188. The SSCD was formerly the Division of Stationary Source Enforcement
(DSSE).
189. Evans, supra note 175, at 11.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 10-12. The study indicated that. since SSCD has perceived sections 11 l(j)
and 113(d)(4) as enforcement tools, it has not publicized the availability of innovation
waivers and has provided little guidance regarding innovation waivers to regional and local
officials. The relatively few applications that it has processed have experienced lengthy
delays as a result of becoming entangled in other EPA agenda. The study documents the
experiences of several section I11(j) and 113(d)(4) applicants who experienced extensive
delays. Id. at 19-31.
192. Id. at 11-12.
193. Id. at 12.
194. See CAA, §§ 113(b), 120(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413(b), 7420(a).
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working with industry to establish alternative compliance sched-
ules for innovative technologies, and for assessing the progress of
technological development. 5' Whatever office is assigned athor-
ity to administer the waiver program, a premium must be placed
on certainty in administration, including clarification of the appli-
cation process. Innovation waiver applications must be processed
expeditiously. Otherwise, new applicants will be discouraged from
applying, and former applicants will be dissuaded from making
future applications.
An additional issue, not raised in the ETIP study but which
deserves consideration, concerns the definition of cost in both the
Clean Air Act waivers. Both waivers include "nonair quality en-
vironmental impact"' 96 among the costs that a source may reduce
in order to qualify for a waiver. By that inclusion, Congress in-
tended to provide an incentive to develop innovations promoting
environmental values as positive benefits. In practice, however,
environmental costs are external to industry. Therefore, industry
has little incentive to develop new technology to reduce costs it
never incurred in the first place. The market solution would be to
force industry to internalize all environmental degradation costs,
but this is outside EPA's scope of authority under the Clean Air
Act. Nonetheless, EPA could ease the Clean Air Act statutory
dilemma in part by allowing an innovator's waiver application to
rely on compliance savings under other environmental regulations
achieved through the technology developed under a Clean Air Act
innovation waiver. In addition, the agency could allow an inno-
vator concurrent waivers under different environmental regula-
tions to develop a process reducing different types of environmen-
tal degradation.
B. The Clean Water Act
I. The Waiver Provision
Section 301(k) is the sole innovation waiver provision of the
Clean Water Act.' 97 It authorizes the EPA Administrator to grant
195. Evans, spra note 175, at 11, 38.
196. CAA, §§ I 111()(1)(A)(ii), 113(d)(4)(C)(ii), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(j)(1)(A)(ii),
7413(d)(4)(C)(ii).
197. CWA,-§ 301(k), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(k) (1982). Section 301(k) applies only to
existing industrial and municipal point sources that discharge directly into navigable waters
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compliance extensions to existing dischargers from the BAT dead-
line. Dischargers may qualify for extended compliance schedules
in two ways: (1) they may install an innovative technology that
results in an effluent reduction significantly greater than BAT.' "X
or (2) they may install an innovative technology that results in an
effluent reduction at the same level as BAT.but with the potential
to achieve that reduction at a significantly lower cost.' 99 In either
case, the discharger must show that the proposed technology has
the potential for industry-wide application.2 °) The technology can
take the form of innovative production processes, innovative con-
trol techniques, or an innovative system.2)" In no event may the
Administrator grant an innovation waiver from BAT effluent lim-
itations past July 1, 1987.
2. Inplementation of the Waiver
Section 301(k) does not appear to suffer from the same am-
biguity regarding eligibility criteria as the innovation waivers under
the Clean Air Act. In its final rule for section 301(k), promulgated
in June 1984, EPA defines "innovative technology" as "a produc-
tion process, a pollution control technique, or a combination of
the two . . . which has not been commercially demonstrated in the
industry of which the requesting discharger is a part."2 "' That
and are thus subject to NPD.ES permits nder section 402. New sources and indirect
dischargers (dischargers into publicly owned treatment works) do not come within the
ambit of § 301(k). Scee 49 Fed. Reg. 25.979. 25.980 (1984).
198. 49 Fed. Reg. 25,982 (to be codified at 4() C.F.R. § 125.23(a)). "Significantly
greater effluent reduction than BAI"' has been defined in the final rule promulgated by EPA
to mean that the effluent reduction in excess of BAT produced by an innovative technology
is significant in comparison to the effluent reduction over best practicable control technology
produced by BAT. See id. (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 125.22(c)).
199. Id. (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 125.23(b)). "Significantly lower cost"' has been
defined in the final rule to mean that "an innovative technology must produce a significant
cost advantage when compared to the technology used to achieve BAT limitations in terms
of annual capital costs and annual operation and maintenance expenses over the useful life
of the technology." Id. (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 125.23(d)).
200. Id. (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 125.23(a), (b)). EPA interprets industry-wide
application to mean that the discharger must demonstrate that the technology can be applied
in at least two facilities that are in one or more industrial categories. The use of innovative
technology in two or more plants owned by the same corporation is consistent with the
definition. See 45 Fed. Reg. 25,978 (1984).
201. CWA. § 301(k), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(k). EPA interprets systems to include both
production processes and control techniques. 49 Fed. Reg. 25,980.
202. 49 Fed. Reg. 25.981 (1984) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 125.22(a)). The regu-
lations also address the issue of what constitutes "commercially demonstrated" technology
and set forth a test for what constitutes a commercial demonstration. The test is whether
the technology has been "successfully operated at full scale in a commercial plant for a full
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definition should prove helpful to the innovator in judging the
novelty of his proposal. Uncertainty may still arise, however, in
those cases where a proposed innovation is insufficiently distinct
from existing commercial applications to form a separate process
or technique.
Another aspect of the Clean Water Act waiver which increases
certainty in the application process concerns the requirement that
an applicant demonstrate that its innovation will result either in
significantly lower effluent levels than BAT or in the same effluent
levels at a significantly lower cost. 2"3 A waiver applicant under the
Clean Water Act does not confront the same dilemma that an
applicant under the Clean Air Act confronts, namely having to
show that the innovation will operate effectively while also show-
ing that it has not been adequately demonstrated."' 4 In that way,
an applicant's uncertainty arises only from the strength of its
demonstration, and not from confr'ontation with a statutory di-
lemma. Noteworthy is EPA's refusal to define further eligibility
for innovation waivers under the Clean Water Act through the
publication of a nonexclusive list of eligible technologies. EPA
observed that even that measure might "serve to stifle incentive
to pursue other options not yet 'approved."'' 5
Because final guidelines have been promulgated only recently,
little empirical data exist to indicate whether these provisions are
providing sufficient guidance to EPA and industry in determining
eligibility. Some indications, however, suggest an improvement.
EPA reports in its publication of the final rule that it "has already
received applications for 301(k) extensions which contend that
savings of over eight million dollars will result, and that improved
effluent treatment will occur.""6
Like the innovation waivers under the Clean Air Act, section
301(k) appears in the enforcement section of the statute. The ad-
m;ini;tr-ti- rf -;Ar, 'l/ hAz.Pw.r h tl nt oP.pn rhI rqr'tpri.p7
11by the same proclivityUII , IIV.for enforcement that characterizes the ad-
by the same proclivity for enforcement that characterizes the ad-
ministration of the innovation waivers under the Clean Air Act. A
State Director or EPA Regional Administrator, after consultation
with a technical review panel appointed by the l)irector of the
Office of Water Enforcement and Permits at PA headqllarters.
decides whether a discharger may receive a waiver." - The tech-
nical review panel's function is to undertake technical evaluations
of proposed technologies, to make uniform determinations on
whether technologies are innovative, to determine whether pro-
jected performance improvements are significant, and to determine
whether they have potential for industry-wide application.20 8 In
addition, the technical review panel may assess technological vi-
ability, thereby reducing the risk of failure in achieving negotiated
compliance schedule deadlines.2 °9
In the event that a discharger fails to meet an extended com-
pliance deadline under section 301(k), after a good faith effort and
where the failure is due to substantial unanticipated problems,
EPA has indicated that, in the interests of encouraging the use of
301(k) extensions, it may elect not to impose civil penalties for the
violation. 21" Instead, it may enter into consent decrees with ex-
peditious compliance schedules.2T EPA adopted this "fail-soft"
approach in its treatment of Penelec's Homer City plant when
Penelec applied for an innovation waiver pursuant to section I I(j)
of the Clean Air Act. '2 EPA approved Penelec's application and
Penelec subsequently reduced its emissions from a level in excess
of 3.0 lbs. S0 2/million Btu to 1.4 lbs., using an advanced coal
cleaning system instead of conventional scrubber technology. Al-
though the reduction by the innovative technology was significant,
Penelec failed to attain the required limitation of 1.2 lbs. within
the time period established under the compliance schedule.2 3 EPA
decided not to impose the penalty in consideration of both Pene-
lec's good faith effort to comply and public hearing testimony
during the application process indicating that capital investment,
cycle of the plant's operations." Id. at 25.980. EPA further distinguishes "pilot plant or
benchscale operations of the technology from reliance upon the technology in a commercial
plant." Id.
203. Id. at 25.982 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 125.23).
204. Compare 49 Fed. Reg. 25.981. 25.982 (to he codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 125.22,
125.23) wit/h CAA. § I 1(j)(1)(A)(i). (ii). 42 U.S.C. § 7411j)(1)(A)(i). (ii) (1982).
205. 49 Fed. Reg. 25.979.
206. Id. at 25.980. 25.981.
207. Id. at 25,979.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See supra text accompanying note 182.
213. Interview with David Foster, Director of the Outreach and Economic Incentives
Staff, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency (Feb. 1. 1985). For the terms of the compliance
schedule established under the innovation waiver granted to Penelec for its Homer City
plant, see 40 C.F.R. § 60(.47 (1984).
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operating costs, overall process energy consumption, and waste
disposal would all be lower using the new innovative system in-
stead of a conventional scrubber-.24 The development of innovative
technology is fraught with complication and delay and constitutell
a risky venture under the best of circumstances. Promotion. there-
fore, requires a "fail-soft" approach. Otherwise. the threat of harsh
noncompliance penalties will discourage innovation waiver
applications.
Another significant issue under the section 301(k) waiver pro-
vision concerns the lack of a broad definition of costs that may be
reduced by a source in order to qualify for a waiver. Under the
Clean Air Act, a source may be granted a waiver if its proposed
technology is likely to meet the standard at a reduced cost. That
cost may take the form of "nonair quality environmental im-
pact[s]."2T 5 The Clean Water Act waiver, however, contains no
comparable incentive to develop innovation to promote environ-
mental values as positive benefits. Section 301(k) innovations need
only achieve "greater effluent reduction than BAT" or "the same
effluent reduction as BAT at a significantly lower cost."2t The
omission represents a danger and a missed opportunity. First, there
is a danger that an acceptable innovation might satisfy one or both
of the above requirements at the cost of some other significant
environmental degradation. The statutory caveat that innovative
processes and control techniques must move "toward the national
goal of eliminating the discharge of all pollutants" only partially
mitigates the danger.2t7 Second, unlike the Clean Air Act waiver
provision, section 301(k) fails to include innovations which would
reduce degradation not covered under the Clean Water Act while
maintaining effluent levels required by BAT. Such innovations
could reduce unregulated degradation, regulated degradation
which does not impose significant costs on the innovator, or any
214. Interview with William H. Foskett, formerly Team Leader, Air Team, Perfor-'
mance Development Inst. (Feb. 1, 1985). See also Evans. supra note 175, at 27.
215. CAA. §§ 111(j). 113(d)(4). 42 U.S.C. §§ 741 1(j). 7413(d)(4). See (also supr text
accompanying note 196.
216. 49 Fed. Reg. 25.982 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 125.23).
217. CWA, § 301(k). 33 U.S.C. § 1311(k) (1982). Some innovations might involve
significant environmental impacts other than pollution. For example. they may use exces-
sive energy or natural resources. This presents a special problem where an innovator
proposes to use large quantities of an inexpensive resource such as water. The environ-
mental impact of a large water diversion may well outweigh the pollution savings over BAT - /
proposed by the innovation.
regulated degradation below regulated levels. At best, innovation
waivers under the Clean Water Act should account for all costs
incurred by the innovator, whether internal or external. In the
absence of Congressional action amending the statute. however.
EPA should at least interpret the statutory caveat regarding pol-
lutant discharges so as to embrace all kinds of environmental
degradation.
Although little empirical data regarding innovation waivers
under the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act exist, indications
are that the provisions have only minimally encouraged techno-
logical innovation. The potential for greater utilization, however,
does exist. The purpose of the innovation waivers is to stimulate
technological innovation beyond the level already required by the
existing standards without sacrificing the health, safety, and en-
vironmental goals of the statutes. In order to co-optimize those
objectives, a regulatory designer must take into account certain
considerations when designing regulations to implement the
statutes.
An initial consideration concerns the attractiveness of the
innovation waiver relative to other compliance options. In fash-
ioning the innovation waiver, the regulatory designer must con-
sider the alternative compliance options available to the regulated
industry. If dischargers perceive other options readily available
that are cheaper or result in more extensive delays than the in-
novation waiver, they will have less incentive to develop innova-
tive technologies. On the one hand, compliance options which
might diminish the relative attractiveness of innovation waivers
include delaying compliance through use of other sections of the
statute,2 '8 obtaining variances, using demonstration grants or in-
dustrial development bonds to acquire outside funding or indirect
subsidies (both of which would provide an independent incentive
to seek innovative techniques), and influencing the writing of reg-
ulations and the enforcement of permits.2t 9 On the other hand,
218. The Clean Water Act does not allow specifically for noninnovation-related
compliance delays. In contrast, subsections 113(d)(l) and 113(d)(2) of the Clean Air Act
allow specifically for noninnovation-related compliance delays. CAA, § 113(d)(1), (2), 42
U.S.C. § 7413(d)(1), (2) (1982).
219. For a detailed discussion of the alternatives to innovation waivers that are
available to firms, see A. Krupnick & D. Yardas, Innovative Technology Compliance
Extensions: A Qualitative Economic Analysis of Section 301(k) of the 1977 Clean Water
Act Amendments 3-8 (1981) (report of the Environmental Policy Evaluation Program.
Resources for the Future. Inc.) (available upon request from authors).
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tightening funds in other programs, tightening regulations so that
noninnovative compliance delays are not, readily available. and
consistently enforcing permit requirements will enhance the at-
tractiveness of innovation waivers. 2"
In fashioning the innovation waiver, the regulatory designer
must define at the outset the goal of the regulation in order to
determine the desired responses from industry. Innovation waivers
currently are designed to stimulate technological innovation
achieving pollution reduction beyond the level already required
under regular standards or achieving the required level at less cost.
In order to stimulate optimum innovation in pollution control tech-
nology, the regulatory designer should not restrict innovation waiv-
ers to proposed "end-of-pipe" technology. Instead, he or she
should design the waivers to provide a strong incentive to industry
to make changes in production processes and product design as
well.
Certain mechanisms may help to provide industry with a
greater incentive to innovate. As noted above, empirical studies
report that industry has voiced concern about time allowances that
it perceives as too short for extensive development of innovative
technologies. One solution would be a flexible delay period to be
determined through negotiation between an innovating firm and an
EPA technical review panel. The settlement might include periodic
monitoring of the firm's progress and noncompliance penalties to
alleviate any cost advantage realized as a result of noncompliance.
An additional incentive to develop innovative technology be-
yond "end-of-pipe" techniques would be adoption of a "fail-soft"
apprdach if the innovation fails and the firm must resort to con-
ventional technology to comply with limitations. This would di-
minish the firm's risk of failure. Since developing innovative tech-
nology is costly, time-consuming, and risky, firms would perceive
strict noncompliance penalties in the event of failure as a strong
disincentive. If a firm in good faith attempts to develop and refine
new processes to meet the required limits, yet fails, the agency
should adopt a sensible enforcement posture that does not unduly
penalize the firm. To prevent possible abuse, however, the agency
should strictly monitor progress in development.
In order to optimize the level of innovation, the regulatory
designer must also consider which respondents the waivers should
address. The Clean Air Act provides innovation waivers for new
sources and for existing sources in violation of their permits. The
Clean Water Act provides an innovation waiver only for existing
dischargers. In order to optimize innovation, the waivers should
be available to both new and existing sources. New sources may
be in the best position to innovate. If they perceive the waiver as
a strong incentive to innovate, they will be less likely to adopt
conventional pollution control technologies and more likely to
develop innovative production processes and products. Finally, if
the regulatory designer desires diffusion of innovative technology
after it is developed, he or she must require that the innovative
firm make its technology commercially available as a condition of
the waiver.
Finally, the regulatory designer must carefully coordinate
management of the program for implementing the innovation waiv-
ers in order to instill a high degree of certainty into the program.
Firms may not perceive innovation waivers as a strong incentive
to innovate unless the agency administers its program with cer-
tainty. The program, therefore, should be publicized. In addition,
a specially designated group, trained to interact with industry
throughout the waiver process, should administer the program.
The agency should delineate a set of eligibility criteria so that firms
can determine with reasonable certainty whether they may qualify
for innovation waivers. Once an application is submitted, it must
be processed expeditiously so that the firm will know early in the
process-before it incurs extensive costs-whether it definitely
will receive a waiver.
C. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
Congress recently included an innovation waiver provision in
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act through the Haz-
ardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984.221 The innovation
221. Pub. L. No. 98-616, § 214, 98 Stat. 3221, 3243 (1984) (to be codified at RCRA,
§ 3005(g). 42 U.S.C. § 6925(g)).
220. Care must be taken not to design and enforce standards so stringently that the
regulated industry perceives that massive noncompliance will result. In that case. the
perception of massive noncompliance may serve as a disincentive to innovate since wide-
spread noncompliance could result in an amendment of the compliance deadlines. See id.
at 4.
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waiver is included in the section of RCRA which sets forth permit
requirements for new and existing facilities that treat, store, or
dispose of hazardous waste. Because the RCRA innovation waiver
was enacted recently, no empirical evidence exists by which to
assess its success. A brief examination of its provisions, however,
may be useful.
The innovation waiver under RCRA is called a Research,
Development, and Demonstration Permit.2 " Under the provision,
EPA is authorized to issue permits for activities covered by RCRA
but which entail "an innovative and experimental hazardous waste
treatment technology or process" 223 for which permit standards
have not been established in the regulations. EPA may issue these
permits independent of the statute's general permit regulations,
except that it may not waive or modify financial responsibility.224
In addition, EPA may waive or modify its basic permitting pro-
cedures in order to expedite permitting, except for procedures
under section 7004(b)(2) concerning public participation.2 5 The
permit may last only one year, with three possible one-year
renewals.226
The permit does not expressly require a showing of feasibility
in advance of allowing an innovative facility to operate. It does
provide, however, that permits
shall provide for the receipt and treatment by the facility of
only those types and quantities of hazardous waste which the
Administrator deems necessary for purposes of determining the
efficacy and performance capabilities of the technology or pro-
cess and the effects of such technology or process on human
health and the environment. 7
Although the permit does not require a showing of feasibility, it
must always "include such terms and conditions as will assure
protection of human health and the environment."'22 Thus, in the-
ory, the innovator carries the economic risk while risks to the
environment are eliminated. In practice, however, risks to human-
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
Id. (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6925(g)).
Id. (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6925(g)(1)).
Id. (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6925(g)(2)).
Id.
Id. (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6925(g)(1)(A). (g)(4)).
Id. (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6925(g)(1)(B)).
Id. (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6925(g)(1)).
health and the environment do exist because of the uncertain
nature of innovative technologies. These risks are partially reduced
by the requirement of an annual review and renewal of the per-mit.
and by the authority granted to EPA to terminate all operations at
the facility upon a determination that "termination is necessary to
protect human health and the environment." 29
The RCRA waiver provision is, in some ways, fundamentally
different from provisions under the Clean Air Act and the Clean
Water Act. This difference may be due, in part, to the different
targets of their respective statutes. Both the Clean Air Act and
the Clean Water Act regulate pollutant discharge levels. RCRA's
regulation of hazardous waste treatment facilities, however, sets
forth permit standards for particular methods of treating, storing,
or disposing of hazardous waste. 2 )" Thus the RCRA permit enables
experimentation with new technologies for which permit standards
do not exist.23' This emphasis on the experimental nature of in-
novation under a RCRA permit contrasts with the insistence on
practical utility of innovation waivers under the Clean Air Act and
the Clean Water Act, both of which require varying. degrees of
demonstration that the innovative technology works before a
waiver will be granted.
Although the RCRA innovation permit was recently enacted,
several observations can be made regarding its potential success.
The RCRA permit is designed to stimulate facilities to make
changes in treatment processes, a venture that involves a signifi-
cant capital investment. An innovator's risk of an adverse regu-
latory reaction after a significant capital investment is threatening
under any of the three statutes. The risk is significant under the
Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act because an innovator must
enter the waiver application process with a technology sufficiently
developed to convince EPA of its probable commercial and envi-
ronmental practicability. Thus the innovator must expend substan-
tial resources before entering the application process. The RCRA
innovation permit, however, reduces that risk. The agency is in-
volved in the project from the start, designing the parameters of
the project by issuing the terms and conditions of the permit,
229. Id. (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6925(g)(3)).
230. RCRA, § 3004, 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (1982).
231. Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, § 214,
98 Stat. 3221, 3243 (1984) (to be codified at RCRA. § 3005(g)(1). 42 U.S.C. § 6925(g)(1)).
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specifying the types and quantities of waste to be processed. and
evaluating the treatment results. Such extensive agency involve-
ment suggests that a project doomed to agency disfivor will be
identified at the earliest point possible, thus reducing the innoval-
tor's risk of unnecessary investment.
The innovator under the RCRA permit system. however, does
face the risk of premature project cancellation, since the agency
may cancel a project any time that a partially developed innovation
poses a threat, no matter how slight. Innovation will occur opti-
mally in a regulatory climate of reduced economic risk. A pre-
mature project cancellation could cause both unnecessary loss of
initial investments and loss of a potentially cost-saving innovation.
The three-year limit on the RCRA permit, after which the
innovator must comply with general permit requirements, further
enhances a facility's risk of failure. The agency's involvement in
the design and testing of the project, however, mitigates that risk.
Early involvement enables the agency to influence the project with
the time limitations in mind. The statute does not specify the
consequences of failure.
RCRA accords substantial discretion to EPA in the adminis-
tration of the innovation permit. EPA can profitably use that dis-
cretion in order to further the attractiveness of the permits. Ac-
cordingly, it would be well-advised to consider its experiences
with innovation waivers under the Clean Air and Clean Water
Acts, and administer the program with a high degree of certainty.
CONCLUSIONS
Based on the history of standard-setting over the last fifteen
years and the history of innovation waivers, it should now be
possible to approach the design of regulation in a manner that can
elicit an appropriate technological response. The key determina-
tions are: (I) what technological response is most desirable, (2) in
which industrial segment is it likely to occur, 2-2 and (3) what form
of regulation will bring about the desired result. The latter two
will require a comprehensive technological assessment of potential
target industrial sectors. The possible technological responses in-
clude a product or process change which can be achieved by
(I) diffusion of existing technology, (2) simple adaptation (incre-
mental innovation), (3) accelerated development of radical inno-
vation already in progress, or (4) radical innovaton.
Innovation waivers apply mostly to process change, are ex-
pressly technology-forcing, and do not promote diffusion.2' The
designer will seldom use a waiver mechanism for promoting radical
process innovation because of the long time generally necessary
to develop the innovation. The designer, however, might well en-
courage both incremental process innovation and acceleration of
radical innovation already underway. Success will require EPA to
give early, clear, and certain signals to the developer, minimizing
the risk of his technology being found unacceptable. Furthermore,
good faith efforts resulting in significant, though not complete,
achievement of the pollution reduction goal should be rewarded
by "fail-soft" strategies, using appropriate and adjustable economic
sanctions.234
Standard-setting can be used to encourage all the varieties of
technological innovation as well as diffusion for both product and
process change. The history over the last fifteen years reveals
significant innovation and essential compliance with very stringent
regulation235 Product-focused regulation primarily elicits a product
response (substitution of existing products or a new product),
Sometimes the new product (e.g. lead-free gasoline) is accom-
panied by significant process innovation as well.2 .6 Process regu-
lation can elicit either a process response or a product change. If
a process restriction is stringent enough, product substitution may
be the only practical response.
Stringency of regulation can be evaluated in terms of both the
extent to which it reduces risks and the extent to which it forces
development of new technology. Stringent regulations which do
not require new technological solutions may appear sufficient, but
233. See supra note 131.
234. See spia text accompanying notes 25-28. 210-214.
235. See sutpra text accompanying notes 34-139. Compliance was achieved even
though, in many cases, industry argued that compliance with the regulation was doubtful
or impossible.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 76-86. In the case of lead-free gasoline, the
process innovation was a new cracking process. See supra text accompanying notes 84-
85.
232. Recall that this requires an examination of the technological dynamics of the
industrial sectors (and related sectors) targeted by the regulations and that the key deter-
mination is the degree of technological rigidity of those sectors. See supra text accom-
panying notes 30-32.
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fall far short of their potential to achieve maximum protection.
For example, the failure to adopt a 0. 1 fiber/ce standard. the lowest
level detectable, for worker asbestos exposure inhibited develop-
ment of substitute products by the asbestos indust-y. ' T'he in-
dustry was able to comply with the 2 fiber/cc standar d simply by
installing existing pollution control equipment. 2)' By failing to
adopt the more stringent standard, OSHA effectively inhibited new
product development and product substitution. 29 Contrary to the
widely held belief that too stringent a regulation inhibits innova-
tion, in some cases a standard not stringent enotugh may inhibit
innovation.
Stringency may, in practice, be affected by the legislative
directive of the agency issuing the regulation. For example, EPA,
OSHA, and CPSC have different legislative mandates. Recently,
the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") directed the EPA
Office of Toxic Substances to construe the scope of its regulatory
authority24 narrowly and to refer appropriate regulation to other
agencies. In particular, OMB directed EPA not to ban three uses
of asbestos, 24 ' but to pass the regulatory responsibility on to
OSHA. 242 Since it has questionable authority to ban dangerous
substances, OSHA could probably only regulate worker exposure
in the manufacturing process or user industries. 243 Thus the direc-
237. See OSHA-NIOSII Group Urges limination of Nonessential Uses. Redtuced
Limits, 9 O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 1067 (Apr. 17. 980). Sec also supra note 139 and accom-
panying text.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 136-139. See also C'A Asbestos Study.
supra note 22, at 19-21.
239. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
240. TSCA, § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 2608 (1982).
241. EPA to Sift Responsibility to OSHA, CPSC. Plans to Rfer Other Chemical
Regulations, 8 CHEM. REG. REP. (BNA) 1315 (Feb. I., 1985). Recently. after serious protest
by environmentalists and EPA employees, EPA appears to be considering a reversal of the
referral policy. EPA Voids Decision. Scraps Referral Plan; Barnes Says Legal, Policy
Issues Unanswered, 8 CHEM. REG. REP. (BNA) 1443 (Mar. 15. 1985); EPA Memo Halting
the Referral of Asbestos, MDA (March 8, 1985), 8 CHEM. RE;. REP. (BNA) 1468 (Mar.
15, 1985).
242. OMB also directed EPA to refer regulation where appropriate to CPSC. EPA
to Shift Responsibility to OSHA. CPSC, Plans to Refitr Other Chetmical Regulations, spra
note 241, at 1315.
243. Whether banning a substance for which there exists a suitable substitute is a
"feasible" regulatory action under OSHA is an untested subject. See OSHA, § 6(b)(5), 29
U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1982). Unlike OSHA. CPSC has clear authority to ban dangerous
products. Its authority, however, extends only to consumer products and not to the largely
industrial products that were the subject of the proposed EPA referral. See CPSA, 8 2, 8.
15 U.S.C. §§ 2051, 2057 (1982).
tives would provide for regulation of ambient levels, rather than a
ban, encouraging the diffusion of ventilation technology rather
than the substitution of new industrial products. 44
Uncertainty in regulatory signals or agency position canl also
deter innovation. Faced with uncertainties which create isks that
the technology developed will not ultimately be needed or will be
unnecessarily costly, potentially innovative industries will simply
adopt low-risk existing technology. Thus, only diffusion will occur.
Both standard-setting designed to encourage innovation and in-
novation waivers have encountered problems with regulatory un-
certainty in the past. 245
The preceding discussion focuses on the regulation of existing
chemicals, though some new chemicals are developed as part of
the technological response. If EPA desires to encourage the de-
velopment of new chemicals to replace toxic chemicals currently
in use, it must take more definitive actions. First, it must be clear
and definite about its pre-manufacturing notification process
(PMN) by providing clear guidelines regarding the specific safety
evaluations which should be undertaken on different classes of
chemicals.2 46 Second, it must increase the likelihood of market
penetration by appropriate regulation of existing toxic chemicals.
This consolidation of new and old chemical regulation is essential
to effect the desired product transition.
In conclusion, the model of the effects of regulation on inno-
vation applied to the history of standard-setting and innovation
waivers over the past fifteen years can contribute to more rational
and deliberate design of regulation. The design should combine an
assessment of the innovative capacity of the possible responding
244. In Sweden, where asbestos has been banned in many applications, several
substitutes have been introduced, many of which (particularly gaskets and friction products)
have been developed by U.S. firms. See, e.g.. Wis. Bus. J., Sept. 1972, at 47; brochures
of Colt'Industries and Scan-Pac Manufacturing, Inc. (available upon request from authors).
245. See, for example, International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615
(D.C. Cir. 1973), where the court remanded EPA's decision to deny a one-year suspension
of the deadline for strict auto emissions standards. The court observed that if the deadline
were strictly enforced, and if any one of the major automobile manufacturers were unable
to meet the deadline, "it is a likelihood that standards Lwould] be set to permit the higher
level of emission control achievable by the laggard." d. at 638. In that event, the techno-
logical leader (Ford Motor Co.) would suffer detriment having "tooled up to meet a higher
standard than [would] ultimately be required." Id. The court was "haunted by the irony"
of this situation. Id. at 637. This kind of uncertainty over whether deadlines will be strictly
enforced creates a disincentive to innovate.
246. TSCA, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 2604 (1982).
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industrial sectors with levels and forms of regulation tailored to
that capacity. The entire process should reflect a realistic evalua-
tion of the best possible achievable goal. In that way. regulation
can be used both to stimulate technological change for health.
safety, and environmental purposes and to bring about a desirable
restructuring of the industrial process.
